We review an argument the cause of the stock market crash in 1987, update the empirical support for that argument, and compare recent market developments. While the market crash on October 19, 1987 was the largest one-day S&P 500 drop in percentage terms in history (20.47%) there was also a large market drop (more than 10.4%) in the three trading days before the 1987 crash. Mitchell and Netter (1989) show that the three-day decline was the largest in more than 40 years, large enough that the drop was news itself (the October 16 th drop immediately before the crash was also an extremely large one-day decline). The theoretical model of Jacklin, Kleidon, and Pfleiderer (1992) shows how a surprise significant drop in the market could have provided information to the market that could directly lead to an immediate crash. Here we follow the stock market for 20 years after 1987, and find the magnitude of the market decline immediately preceding October 19, 1987 was still a significant outlier --only one threeday period in the 20 years after 1987 had as large a market decline. We also document the large market movements and volatility in the period beginning in October 2008 and suggest that this volatility is different than what occurred in 1987. ______________________________________________________________________________________ JEL classification: G1, G01, G13, G34 *We would like to thank Glenn Baigent, Annette Poulsen, and a referee for helpful comments and suggestions on the paper. 
What Caused the 1987 Stock Market Crash and Lessons for the 2008 Crash
The cover story from the Newsweek (1987) issue that was released the weekend directly before the October 19, 1987 crash was titled "Is the Party Over?" The second paragraph of the article starts, "The cascading Dow and record trading volume marked a major shift in psychology and sent a powerful shiver across the country," -- Dentzer, Thomas, Wang, and Friday (1987) .
Introduction
On Monday October 19, 1987, the U.S. equity market suffered its largest singleday percentage decline in history. The S&P 500 index fell by 57.86 points, a decline of 20.46%. The Dow Jones Industrial average suffered a similar decline, falling by 508 points, 22.6% of its value. The NASDAQ fell by 46 points, 11.35% of its value (although many of the dealers stopped trading early, limiting the reported decline). An important, but often forgetten, factor in this decline was the 10.12% decline in the S&P 500 in the three trading days prior to October 19. Mitchell and Netter (1989) argue that this three-day decline was an important contributing factor to the crash -in fact, they describe the decline as a "trigger." In this paper, we review this argument, provide simple descriptive evidence supporting the argument and suggest how October 1987 is different from the market decline in late 2008. We report data that the drop in the stock market immediately proceeding the The October 19, 2007 market crash of more than 20% did not seem to be related to any fundamental news. However, Mitchell and Netter (1989) argue that the three-day decline preceding the crash was a large enough decline that it became the fundamental news and that shook the market. The theoretical model of Jacklin, Kleidon, and Pfleiderer (1992) (among others) shows how a surprise significant drop in the market could have provided information to the market that would directly lead to a crash. In this paper, we present evidence that even 20 years later, the magnitude of the market decline immediately preceding the 1987 is still a significant outlier -only one three-day period in the 20 years after 1987 had as large a market drop.
Jacklin, Kleidon, and Pfleiderer's model suggests that the sharp market decline preceding the 1987 crash revealed the effects of new investment strategies by investors that had not been fully anticipated by the market (they build on Grossman's (1988) 
Explanations for the October1987 Crash
There are at least three general views of the causes of the stock market crash on
October 19, 1987. The views are not mutually exclusive. One is the efficient market story -the market reacted to some fundamental news that led market participants to revalue stocks down by more than 20% in one day. A second is a liquidity story -for some reason, probably a large number of sell orders, liquidity declined significantly, depressing prices. A third is some variant of a behavioral finance story -investors acting irrationally either drive prices up too high, followed by a significant fall, or panic and sell for some reason, significantly depressing prices.
2.1. Explanations of large market-wide stock-price movements Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1989) analyze the question of what fundamentally causes large stock price movements in a paper that followed soon after the 1987 crash.
Their general conclusion is that we are not very good at explaining large stock price movements, questioning the "efficiency" of the market. They first consider the impact of macroeconomic news on the stock market. The paper considers such macroeconomic fundamentals as dividend payments, industrial production, real money supply, long and short-term interest rates, inflation and stock market volatility. They conclude that these macroeconomic variables are not statistically meaningful in explaining stock market returns.
Cutler et. al. also conduct a less formal analysis of the impact of "big news" on the stock market. Using the World Almanac as a source of significant news stories, the paper narrows its selection of "big news" to those stories which were featured on the front page of the New York Times or were the lead story in the business section of the Congress backed off. In addition, the cross-sectional and microstructure movements went in the predicted ways. All of their tests support the premise that the tax legislation was key to the stock market decline in the three trading days before the market crash. Further, they present evidence that it is unlikely that other news, including the trade deficit, caused the decline.
Two other papers, Miller and Mitchell (1999) and Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007) , examine in more detail how the news about the tax could have caused a major decline in the market. Miller and Mitchell (1999) examine whether fundamental news could conceivably explain the market movements of October 1987 and show that fairly modest changes in expected future cash flows or discount rates can result in large market revaluations. The authors state, "while it might first seem that one should be able to identify the shocks to fundamental factors that can cause such a dramatic price decline, the above analysis suggests that these shocks do not necessarily have to be dramatic themselves. " Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007) analyze how costly arbitrage mispricing "can be large and can extend for a long period." They consider several examples, include the stock market crash. They show how the tax bill caused merger arbitragers to sell on October 14 th through the 16 th and the selling increased on the 19 th accelerating the price decline. Roll (1989) , however, argues that the international nature of the decline over the weekend of October 17 th and 18 th is not consistent with the takeover-tax story. Mitchell and Netter note however that the world decline occurred after the U.S. decline and was much smaller in magnitude (an equally weighted world index fell 2.03%). Further, as we discuss below, the world movement may be consistent with the trigger story told my
Mitchell and Netter -the large three-day decline started the whole market downward.
The importance of the market decline before October 19, 1987
Grossman (1988) models a situation where the amount of dynamic hedging undertaken by traders is not public knowledge until they trade on these strategies. When coordinated selling occurred based on these strategies (e.g., during a big market decline) liquidity issues will further depress the market. Grossman notes that if there were more dynamic hedging strategies in place than anticipated by traders, traders might be unable to execute all the dynamic hedging they had planned, increasing market volatility.
Jacklin, Kleidon, and Pfleiderer (1992) also address the situation where a market has underestimated the amount of dynamic hedging strategies such as portfolio insurance, and the true amount if the hedging is revealed. However, unlike Grossman they concentrate on the effect the revelation of the information about the extent of dynamic hedging will have on traders' valuation of securities. In this case, the market will decline to reflect the information that the market was overvalued. Jacklin et al. note the large decline on October 16 th fits with their model. While the liquidity problems pointed out by the Brady Commission (1988) and Grossman played a role in the crash, it is unlikely they were enough to cause the crash on their own.
Large Market Movements since 1950
In this section we report on market movements and volatility since 1950, concentrating on evidence post-1987. Our goal is two-fold. First, we provide evidence that supports the argument that the market drop in the trading period immediately before the 1987 crash was an unusually large decline. Second, we report recent evidence on the unprecedented nature of the September -November 2008 "crash." Note here our single most important piece of evidence (contained in remain an extraordinary period of decline in the history of the stock market. In this section we explore both of these issues: the volatility and resiliency of the market since the crash, and the historic nature of the 14 th -16 th October 1987 period, which preceded the crash. This followed a relatively large rise in the market on 3 rd January of 5.01%
Volatility and Volume
(volume of $1,880,700,032)
• 1 st September 1998: volume reached $1,216,600,064 as the S&P returned 3.86%.
This followed a relatively large fall in the market on 30 th August of -6.80%
(volume of $917,500,032)
• 28 th October 1997: volume reached $1,202,550,016 as the S&P returned 5.12%.
This followed a relatively large drop in the market on 27 th October of -6.87%
(volume of $693,729,984)
• 16th August 2007: volume reached $6,509,300,000 as the S&P returned 0.32%.
This followed a relatively large drop in the market on 14th and 15th August of -1.82% and -1.39% respectively (volume of $3,814,630,000 and $4,290,930,000)
• 18th September 2008: volume reached $10,082,689,600 as the S&P returned 4.33%. This followed a relatively large drop in the market on 17th September of -4.71% (volume of $9,431,870,400)
These final cases show that four of the most noticeable spikes in volume during this period came on the days after a large market decline. However, these volume spikes were not associated with market declines themselves. In general, the months of September, October and November 2008 saw an unusually high number of significant 3-day declines. The magnitude of the decline over the 14 th -16 th October 1987 period is still historically high, however, even though it has since been joined by other comparable 3-day declines. The fact that none of these more recent 3-day declines triggered a market crash similar to 19 th October 1987 reinforces the notion that the market is now different to how it was back in 1987. Table II 
Conclusion
In this paper we use the twenty years since the market crash of October 1987 to further strengthen the argument that the period immediately before the crash (October 14-16 th ) period saw an unusually large market decline. We review the arguments that this initial market decline of 14 th -16 th October precipitated the crash on Monday, October 19 th . We argue that the news of the large three-day drop from the 14 th to the 16 th led to the crash on the 19 th .
Mitchell and Netter (1989) perform a detailed case study analysis of the causes of the market decline from October 14 th to the 16 th . They argue that while several factors matter, the most important was a proposed tax bill that would have sharply restricted the takeover market by, among other things, ending the interest deductibility of debt used in takeovers.
There are several theories on how the large three-day decline could lead to a crash on the next trading day (October 19 th ). They center on the idea that either a significant decline revealed negative information about the market, led to liquidity problems in trading, or changed investor psychology. However, the theories rest to some extent on the premise that the downward market movement was significant and unexpected.
Critical to all the theories is that the decline of over 10% in the three days before the crash was very unusual. Mitchell and Netter note it was the biggest one-, two-, or three-day decline since the unexpected victory of Germany over France in WW II. Here we examine the twenty years since and find that the market decline the week before the crash was indeed an unusually large decline in market history.
While the twenty years since the crash have seen the volume of trading on the NYSE increase dramatically, and while there have been episodes or days with large market movements, the October 14 th -16 th 1987 period still ranks high amongst periods of severe market decline. While an argument can be made that the infrastructure of the market has improved over the last twenty years so that the market is better able to cope with episodes of high volume and illiquidity, it is also fair to say that the three days 24, 25, 28 May 1962 -9.18% 10, 11, 12 Sep 1986 -6.86% 15, 18, 19 Nov 1974 -6.65% 23, 26, 27 Jun 1950 -6.52% 19, 20, 21 May 1970 -6.24% 
